INTERIM GOVERNMENT AIMS TO BOOST 2018 – 2019 STRATEGY

Eugenio G. Martínez / CarpeDiem Report
We were based on the fact that it would not be an enduring crisis. We genuinely believed it. You may find quotes from me and (Elliott) Abraham, stating: it’s not a matter of years or months, it’s a matter of weeks, and it was obviously wrong.” This statement issued by Carrie Filipetti, who served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Cuba and Venezuela during Donald Trump’s administration, reveals a misreading of the events by the Trump administration and by the Venezuelan opposition. 

With the fourth year of the Interim Government of Juan Guaidó, today we can see a definitive breakdown between most of the G4 members (Justice First, Democratic Action, and a New Era) and the Interim Government (Popular Will and minority parties).

Partly excluded, the strategy of the Interim Government starting 2022 is focused on the establishment of the coalition Let’s Save Venezuela, with the participation of the members of Popular Will and minority parties, including some groups of the civil society. Prior to Let’s Save Venezuela, the (united) opposition raised the flags of Operation Freedom, Unity Agreement and the National Salvation Agreement. In general, all these efforts have been focused on five elements.

• To foster the opposition unity (through this path the Unity Platform was created to represent the opposition in Mexico). However, it has only been possible that the sectors and individuals still aligned with the interim government got involved in the coalition Let’s Save Venezuela.
• To undertake efforts to create majority and push internally in the street through the citizen and party organization.
• To fight for holding fair and transparent elections (the interim government has refused to participate in the elections without first obtaining the conditions for competitiveness). Guaidó’s speech through

Let’s Save Venezuela stresses the need to agree on holding presidential and parliamentary elections. However, its spokespersons in Washington and Europe highlight that no presidential elections with guarantees will be held in 2024; therefore, it is necessary to be ready for a new boycott similar to the one occurred in 2018. This speech explains the reasons why the opposition is not involved in urgent tasks such as registering 5 million potential voters that are abroad.

• Another discourse concerning Let’s Save Venezuela (as in the previous plans) is to strengthen and expand international support for the Interim Government.
• To achieve a political agreement with the ruling coalition involving guarantees and the gradual lifting of sanctions in exchange for the restoration of rights (in this case through negotiations with Mexico).

In addition, the Interim Government is preparing for the internal political debate by manipulating the little quorum available in the 2015-elected National Assembly. Interim President Juan Guaidó has repeatedly highlighted that most of the seats of AD, PJ and UNT at the 2015-elected National Assembly “is and must be circumstantial”. To achieve this, minority groups such as Popular Will or the Pro-Agreement Bloc have implemented the strategy to include alternate deputies (although they are not proclaimed by the CNE in 2015) to create a majority in the next plenary session. These inclusions were undertaken violating the institutional structure of parliament upon the approval at the Delegated Committee rather than a regular session.

Meanwhile, the opposition political dissidents of the Interim Government have engaged in processes to relegitimize their authorities, considering an electoral scenario that must be realized through the negotiation table in Mexico.

A transition, not to democracy, but to a more comfortable system for the chavismo-madurismo regime. In this regard, for now, the pro-reform sector aligned with the government of Maduro is still undertaking efforts to realize a negotiated pluralism and there may be relevant changes in the election authority for the 2022-2024 term that are bound to the resumption of talks in Mexico.

However, the most radical chavismo hopes to achieve a hegemonic control in a political sense. At this moment, the control of the Venezuelan political process lies with the pro-reform sector aligned with Maduro’s government.

However, the opposition in general is at a standstill. Moreover, the debate on the holding of primary elections have been overshadowed following Biden administration’s decision to break with one of the main US foreign policy strategies toward Venezuela focused on avoiding any direct contact between the White House and Miraflores, and entrust the dialogue to the intermediation of the Interim Government.

The White House’s decision paralyzed the political sectors dissidents of the Interim Government, while their response was focused on the political-electoral agenda of (Rep.) Senator Marco Rubio in Florida.  

In our previous report, we noted that upon overcoming the catastrophic standoff between the chavismo and opposition, Venezuela has initiated a transition, not to democracy, but to a more comfortable system for the chavismo-madurismo regime. In this regard, for now, the pro-reform sector aligned with the government of Maduro is still undertaking efforts to realize a negotiated pluralism and there may be relevant changes in the election authority for the 2022-2024 term that are bound to the resumption of talks in Mexico.

However, the most radical chavismo hopes to achieve a hegemonic control in a political sense. At this moment, the control of the Venezuelan political process lies with the pro-reform sector aligned with Maduro’s government.  

The possible removal from office of CNE rector Tania D´Amelio to become part of the Electoral Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice can lead to significant changes in the electoral body. Without Tibisay Lucena in the CNE (as president from 2006 to 2020), D´Amelio assumed the political control of the body. Her removal from office may help continue the process of granting unilateral concessions to the opposition sector that still supports the electoral path. This scenario is of interest to the party dissidents of the Interim Government

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